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Reconsidering the Mind/Body 
Distinction: Towards a Continuist 
Ontology of Consciousness 
MICHAEL ROBILLARD
“Nature stretches without a break from lifeless objects to animals through 
things that are animated but not animals, so that there seems to be very little 
difference between one thing and the next, they are so close together.”
Aristotle, De Partibus Animalium 1
I
n his paper, “The State and Fate of Contemporary Philosophy of Mind,” 
John Haldane likens the present condition of Philosophy of Mind to that 
of the philosophically stultifying period of late scholasticism, where naming 
took the place of explaining, and philosophy was reduced to taxonomy.2 
Haldane argues that our current physicalistic lexicon has made it virtually 
“impossible to accommodate the basic features of mindedness revealed in reﬂection 
and direct experience.”3 For Philosophy of Mind to progress, Haldane argues, we 
must “make space” for alternative modes of knowing that exist beyond the bounds 
of our current, overly physicalistic terminology.
Similar to Haldane, but offering a much bleaker picture of contemporary 
Philosophy of Mind, is Colin McGinn. In his essay, “Can We Solve the 
Mind-Body Problem?” McGinn advances what he refers to as his Mysterian 
view of consciousness, the view that human cognition is, by design, simply 
incapable of generating the concept(s) necessary for adequately explaining 
psycho-physical interaction. Just as a dog’s mind is cognitively closed to the 
concepts of Einsteinian Physics, so too, McGinn argues, is the human mind 
cognitively closed to the property that links mind and body. McGinn therefore 
concludes that the mind-body problem is fundamentally insoluble.4
Surveying the landscape of contemporary Philosophy of Mind from two 
rather different vantage points, Haldane and McGinn nonetheless arrive at 
very similar conclusions. Whereas both agree that contemporary Philosophy 
of Mind has reached an impasse, and that the language we currently use when 
speaking about consciousness is fundamentally inadequate, Haldane argues 
that what is necessary for Philosophy of Mind to advance is the generation 
of new language, and McGinn concludes that such language is nowhere to 
be found. 
In this paper I argue that the impasse suggested by Haldane and McGinn 
directly stems from the presupposed notion of a sharp, binary distinction 
between mind and body. Hardly ever stated outright, this presupposition 
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is instead expressed tacitly through their presentation of the 
hard problem-that the physical as we deﬁne it cannot in any 
meaningful causal way bring about the mental, for the two are 
divided by a seemingly unbridgeable gap. What is therefore 
necessary, I argue, is a new way of looking at the mind-body 
problem that gets us away from seeing and speaking of reality 
strictly in terms of a discrete subject/object divide.  In this paper 
I propose that the sharp distinction between mind and body, 
often assumed by many philosophers to be metaphysically 
foundational, is in fact false, and rather, that mind and body 
coexist upon an unbroken, graded continuum. If we thereby 
grant ontological primacy to a continuum of mind and body, 
we are now presented with a possible alternative explanation 
of consciousness that avoids to a large extent, the glaring 
inconsistencies of substantival Dualism as well as the woeful 
incompleteness of classic Physicalism.5 Furthermore, this 
new ontology provides a possible new starting point for both 
Haldane and McGinn; one that might provide Haldane the 
new language he is searching for, and likewise, one that might 
serve to rescue McGinn from the conceptual dead-end created 
by our present language.  Accordingly, for the functional 
purposes of this paper I will here on out refer to this alternative 
viewpoint as a Continuist explanation of consciousness.
In this paper I will attempt to further develop this Continuist 
conception of mind and body. I will do so in two parts.  The 
ﬁrst part of this paper will be devoted to the task of ﬁnding 
an adequate metaphysics in which to ground our theory. 
Borrowing from Stephen R.L. Clark’s, “Deconstructing the 
Laws of Logic”, I will attempt to show how the epistemological 
problems raised by Clark suggest a metaphysical reality that 
is fundamentally continuous rather than discrete or atomistic. 
Once this grounding is ﬁrmly established, I will move on to 
the second part of this paper where I will attempt to extend 
this concept of continuity speciﬁcally to the mind-body 
problem, building upon the conceptual scaffolding laid forth 
in the Synechism of C.S. Pierce.  Using Pierce, I will attempt 
to advance this Continuist position in strong hopes that it will 
allow us to view consciousness and the mind-body problem 
through fresh eyes.
Blurring the Line
Before we set about the task of further developing this 
Continuist position, we must ﬁrst provide it with an adequate 
metaphysical foundation on which to stand.  As brieﬂy stated 
before, one incipient solution ﬁt for the task can be found in 
Stephen R.L. Clark’s, “Deconstructing the Laws of Logic”.  In 
his essay, Clark challenges the ontological status of some of the 
bedrock foundations of formal Logic.  Clark argues that our 
lived reality is that of an unbroken, continuous spectrum of 
experience, absent of the clean, crisp, and discrete distinctions 
found in the world of bivalent logic and language. Given 
this incongruity between abstract logic and the experienced 
world, Clark concludes that these so-called “laws” are either 
false, or alternatively, that they “identify a reality distinct from 
the ordinary world of experience, and also from the ultimate 
source of reality.”6 Clark’s argument thereby suggests that 
without clear-cut, distinct boundaries differentiating between 
one atomic simple or “thing” and another (as the laws of logic 
would lead us to believe), reality is therefore not at all discrete 
but instead, an unbroken, contiguous spectrum. As Clark puts 
it, “our reality is ineradicably continuous, and there are therefore 
no abrupt changes of the kind that logic and language might 
lead us to suppose.”7
In his essay, Clark exposes some of the paradoxes and 
inconsistencies latent within formal logic by pitting the law of 
Non-Contradiction against the law of Excluded Middle.  He 
does so in the following manner.  Clark ﬁrst reminds us of the 
two laws of logic in question;   
1.) The Law of Excluded Middle (EM): either p or ~p
2.) The Law of Non-Contradiction (NC): not both p and ~p.  
 
He then asks us to imagine a given segment, spatial or temporal, 
extending from L1, through L2, to L3.  That is, L1 – L2 – L3 
could represent one thing next to another (in space) or one 
thing leading to another (in time). Next, Clark asks us to 
imagine an x, such that, from L1 to L2, x is A, and from L2 to 
L3, x is ~A (as depicted below).
              x = A                          x = ~A
L1 ============= L2============ L3 
 
With this scenario ﬁrmly in place, Clark asks; if x is A prior to 
L2, and x is ~A after L2, then what is x immediately at L2?  Here 
is where the problem begins to rear its head. If we conclude that 
x is both A and ~A then the Law of Non Contradiction fails. 
Conversely, if we say that x is neither A or ~A then the Law of 
Excluded Middle fails.8 A potential solution that appears to 
get us around this problem, while preserving the integrity of 
both laws, is to assert that, “the laws of logic only apply within 
a discontinuous world, where there are no points between 
adjacent points, so that the object is A from L1 to L2, and not 
A from L2* to L3, but through L2 and L2* are different, there 
are no points at all between them.”9 But even this move leads us 
to an equally undesirable conclusion.  
 
If we are to assert that there are in fact no points through L2 
and L2*, then what we are left with, it would seem, is a peculiar 
type of ‘nothing’; a concept very similar, Clark argues, to that 
of Epicurus’ “void”.  To assert this void, Clark argues, still does 
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us no good, for it would seem that there must be a place where 
point and void touch, and in so doing, leaving that place of 
contact subject to the same argument as before.  Furthermore, 
the ontological consequence of asserting a void go far beyond 
the localized case of L2 and L2*; its ramiﬁcations extending 
throughout the entire segment of L1 to L3.  If we assert that it 
is neither true nor false that x is A (or ~A) at the speciﬁc point 
of L2, then the implication is that we cannot say that x is A at 
any point between L1 and L3.  As Clark puts it, “While it may 
seem that, if there are truths, they must be true at any point 
in the period during which they are true, we might conclude 
instead that periods are not made up of points. That is; our reality 
is ineradicably continuous.”10 (My italics.)    
 
What then must we conclude from the problems raised by 
Clark’s argument? If Clark is correct, then it seems we are 
unable to deﬁnitively pin down the truth status of a single, 
atomistic point. This conclusion forces us to ask the following 
question; what must reality fundamentally be like to allow for 
such consequences?  One possible metaphysical solution, not 
too far reaching, is to conclude that reality is not at all discrete 
or atomistic, but rather, that it is fundamentally continuous.   
If reality is continuous in the way that Clark suggests, then 
may it also not be continuous in regard to Mind-Body, where 
the two are not sharp metaphysical categories but, rather, poles 
on a continuous line? By following this line of thought, we can 
begin to solve the hard problem.
Towards Continuity
How then does this Continuist ontology speciﬁcally apply 
to the mind-body problem? One immediately recognizable 
advantage to positing a continuum of mind and body is that it 
promises to eliminate the problem of having to bridge the so-
called “explanatory gap” between the world of the mental and 
the world of the physical. For on the Continuist view, there 
is no gap. Since Descartes, the Achilles’ Heel of substantival 
Dualism has been that of trying to explain psycho-physical 
interaction without reliance upon some sort of “bridge entity” 
to ﬁll this gap.11 For Descartes this bridge entity took the form 
of the pineal gland. Descartes posited that the pineal gland 
contained additional bridge entities, both will (mind) and spirit 
(body), and thus could function as the interface point where 
the worlds of mental and physical came into contact with one 
another. This move however failed to resolve the issue, as all it 
did was compress the problem of mind-body interaction into 
the localized microcosm of the pineal gland, leaving us with 
the same inherent dualism as before.  That is, as long as we 
are dealing in terms of mental and physical, then the bridge 
spanning the chasm between mind and body must therefore be 
made of either the mental or the physical. If it is physical then 
it fails to connect to the mental. If it is mental then it fails to 
connect to the physical. Thus, the positing of a bridge entity 
does us no good in crossing the mind-body divide. 
Mind-Body Continuism, however, provides us with a potential 
way around this problem. By putting mind and body on a 
continuum, we are no longer faced with the intractable problem 
of having to reconcile two radically dichotomous worlds. Rather, 
the world of the mental and world of the physical would now 
inhabit one shared world along the continuum, with aspects of 
both mind and body extending into and interpenetrating one 
another in myriad forms and fashions.12  In short, mind and 
body would now differ only in degree but no longer in kind. 
Thus, the problem of bridging the explanatory gap between 
mind and body would be effectively eliminated, for the gap 
would no longer be there.
As a further remark, and one pointing to the profound 
advantage of Continuism, consider the issue of causation 
and the hard problem. Under the common formulations of 
causation, a given object or event, existing in prior space-time, 
is often said to be the cause of another object or event existing 
in later space-time, if it meets certain criteria. However, under 
a Continuist ontology, this formulation of causality fails, for it 
depends on there being these independent, discrete identities 
of the objects of cause and effect. However, since Continuism 
does away with all sharp, discrete edges, the integrity of the 
atomic identities of cause and effect dissolve. Thus, it would 
make little sense to speak of A causing B, for in a sense, at the 
point of contact A is B, or, in the spirit of Aristotle’s De Partibus 
Animalium, “there seems to be very little difference between 
one thing and the next, they are so close together.”13
As Clark demonstrates, just as there is ambiguity regarding 
truth status of a given point (in time or space), so too is there 
ambiguity regarding the point of causal contact between cause 
and effect. With no clear distinction as to where cause ends 
and effect begins, discussion of mind-body interaction becomes 
increasingly difﬁcult on the standard dualist line.  But this 
is precisely the strength of Continuism, since it offers a way 
out of the hard problem by denying that there is a sharp 
distinction between mind and body in the ﬁrst place.  Hence, 
the possibility is now created for formulations of mind-body 
interaction without reliance upon dualistic bridge entities or 
dualistic language that take the standard form of either “mind” 
or “body” and thus result in contradiction.  Instead, under this 
new Continuist ontology, we can now make formulations of 
mind-body interaction using Continuist entities that take the 
form of neither “mind” nor “body,” or both “mind” and “body.” 
Whatever language we come up with to “bridge the gap,” so 
to speak, it will have to be of a Continuist order, according to 
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Continuism, and thus, following Clark, will present us with 
entities that are neither/nor or both/and “mind” and “body.”  
A ﬁnal advantage of Continuism is that it preserves, equally, 
aspects of both mind and body without seeking to reduce one to 
the other. Unlike an Idealism that attempts to explain matter in 
terms of mind, or a Physicalism that attempts to explain mind 
in terms of matter, Continuism provides a metaphysics that 
puts mind and body on equal ontological footing.  Another 
position that likewise attempts to end the tug of war between 
Idealism and Physicalism by granting equal ontological status to 
mind and body is Russell’s Neutral Monism.  However, unlike 
Neutral Monism, Continuism does not run into the problem 
of introducing a third metaphysical category, “the neutral”, 
and then having to explain how it is that this third category 
interacts with or brings about the categories of mind and body. 
Rather than introducing an additional metaphysical category, 
Continuism, in fact, does the complete opposite by attempting 
to dissolve the absolute division of the metaphysical categories 
of mind and body altogether into a continuist relation.
More so than Russell’s Neutral Monism, Mind-Body 
Continuism most closely resembles the doctrine of Synechism 
advocated by C.S. Pierce.  Pierce deﬁnes Synechism as “the 
tendency to regard continuity as an idea of prime importance 
in Philosophy.”14 This theme of continuity echoes throughout 
all of Pierce’s works to include his writings regarding mind and 
body. Under a Piercean ontology, mind is seen as extending 
continuously throughout all of nature by different degrees and 
in different concentrations.  Thus, what we commonly call 
matter is, according to Pierce, really mind but in a “degraded or 
undeveloped” form.15  Likewise, Pierce regards the mechanical 
laws of nature as being, “acquired habits, like all the regularities 
of mind.”16 Pierce therefore concludes that “[t]he idealist has no 
reason to dread a mechanistic theory of life.”17 Although Pierce 
advocates more of an Idealist position than a truly Continuist 
position his writings nonetheless present a conception of mind 
that attempts to avoid the sharp mind/body distinction.
Conclusion
It has been said that if you do what you’ve always done, you’ll get 
what you’ve always gotten.  Such is the case with contemporary 
Philosophy of Mind. New versions of old Dualist and 
Physicalist solutions, no matter how dressed up the in the latest 
in vogue technical language, still carry with them the same old 
problems.   Hemmed in by classic dualistic/ binary blinders, 
our conceptual and linguistic framework has simply been too 
narrow for the task at hand.  The resulting tunnel vision has 
kept us locked into standard inadequate formulations of the 
question with equally inadequate formulations of solutions.  
 
What is necessary for contemporary Philosophy of Mind to 
progress is the reformulation of both solution and question in 
a way that allows us to speak of things in any other way than 
in terms of a strict mind/body dichotomy.  The Continuist 
viewpoint that I have advanced in this paper, though far from 
perfect, at the very least makes an honest attempt to break out 
from the standard mold and to try something new, for the old 
certainly isn’t working. From Maxwell’s merging of electricity 
and magnetism, to Einstein’s uniﬁcation of matter and energy, 
to the formulation of a “space-time continuum”, and even to 
the fall of the Berlin Wall; progress, as it were, in virtually every 
area of human endeavor, has come in the form of the dissolution 
of presumed boundaries and the uniﬁcation of seemingly 
irreconcilable parts.  Is it really then so hard to imagine that 
one day we might come to discover that the impenetrable wall 
separating mind and body, subject and object, seer and the 
thing seen, might turn out to be equally permeable and not so 
solid after all?
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